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The process of second-language acquisition, while key to many facets of daily life in 
a globalized world, has been undervalued as a topic for philosophical investigation. 
This process, for perhaps obvious reasons, has been understood in a representation-
alist sense as an activity of the “mind.” However, there is a good deal of empirical and 
philosophical support for embodied and situated approaches to the human experi-
ence and the mind, provoking a more holistic perspective on language acquisition, 
among many other fields of study. Among other benefits, these approaches set aside 
the typical Cartesian dualism and neuro-centric ways of understanding human intel-
ligence. One such situated approach, Dreyfus’ skillful coping, provides a new angle to 
the process of second language acquisition by presenting language as a responsive, 
dynamic and social practice. 
A renewed perspective regarding the mind and language also implies a new perspec-
tive on epistemological concerns, particularly involving the nature of knowledge-that 
and knowledge-how. Assuming that knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that 
assumes a traditional concept-driven view of the mind, while assuming that knowl-
edge-that is reducible to knowledge-how results in a more action-driven view. De-
spite the common place acceptance of this epistemological division, many examples 
provoke doubt. For instance, riding a bike is normally understood as a clear instance 
of knowledge-how, but we can also consider that riding a bike includes a good deal 
of knowledge-that, such as what a bike is. Likewise, knowing something (like know-
ing who shot Abraham Lincoln) can also include various abilities such as remember-
ing, expressing or responding. These cases, among many others, merely serve to 
demonstrate that knowledge-that and knowledge-how are not easily separated. As 
such, this distinction is often not helpful to phenomenological experience nor to phil-
osophical inquiry. While some maintain that there are meaningful distinctions be-
tween knowledge-that and knowledge-how, the intellectualist approach finds that 
knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that (Fantl, 2008, p. 452). In the example 
of riding a bike, knowing-how to ride a bike is actually comprised of many instances 
of knowledge-that regarding the bike, such as what pedals and handlebars are, and 
that feet should be put on the pedals. In contrast to intellectualism, and compatible 
with skillful coping, stands radical anti-intellectualism, otherwise termed practical-
ism. 
Practicalism is the position that knowledge-that can be explained in terms of knowl-
edge-how (Fantl, 2012). Rather than the traditional notion of justified true belief, 
knowledge of p being the case can instead be understood as the capacity “to respond, 
to reply, to represent or to reason accurately that p” (Hetherington, 2006, p.77, quot-
ed in Fantl, 2012). While intellectualist approaches often try to reduce knowledge-
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how to a specific list of knowledge-that claims, anti-intellectualists find that “there 
is no single canonical list of these kinds of action [that comprise knowing-that p]” 
(Hetherington, 2015, p. 568). For the anti-intellectualist, various abilities constitute 
knowing who shot Abraham Lincoln, but it isn’t necessarily the case that we could 
list all of them, nor would need to when recognizing how knowledge-that is com-
prised of knowledge-how. To summarize, considering knowledge-that as the basis 
for knowledge-how endorses conceptual ideas as instrumental to the mind (intellec-
tualism), while considering knowledge-how as the basis for knowledge-that endors-
es an action-driven view of the mind (practicalism). For this reason, an embodied, 
situated and action-driven approach like skillful coping is more clearly aligned with 
practicalism.
Language and one’s manipulation of a language also become indispensable to re-
sponding, replying, representing, reasoning and other abilities that constitute knowl-
edge for the practicalist. An earnest consideration of anti-intellectual and non-rep-
resentationalist understandings of how we comport ourselves skillfully and acquire 
new skills can offer a novel take on second-language acquisition problems, such as 
the poverty of the stimulus, and demonstrate the role of language in the human ex-
perience as fundamentally responsive and expressive. 
One such anti-intellectual and non-representationalist view is Dreyfus’ skillful cop-
ing, which itself is a continuation of and application of Merleau-Ponty’s intention-
al arc and maximal grip. Dreyfus (2002) offers a non-representationalist account of 
learning and skill acquisition that places the actor in relationship to his environment. 
The intentional arc is 
the tight connection between the agent and the world, viz. that as the agent 
acquires skills, these skills are ‘stored,’ not as representations in the mind, 
but as more and more refined disposition to respond to more and more 
refined perceptions of the current situation (Dreyfus, 2002, p.1). 
This connection between the learner and his environment culminates in “more se-
lective responses” (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 234). The key to this development of selective 
responses as it is understood by Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus is that representation of 
the end stage, or of doing the task well, is not necessary in order to be directed to-
ward the goal. The intentional arc is to a large extent similar to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ 
1980 five-stage model of skill acquisition, which, to put it briefly, details a number of 
ways in which students transition from abstract understandings of the rules govern-
ing their behavior to being able to complete the task at hand in a skillful and nuanced 
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way. Rather than being neatly divided into stages explicitly, progressing to better re-
sponses is a gradual and dynamic practice. 
Through this intentional arc, the learner attempts to achieve maximal grip, which for 
Dreyfus is “the body’s tendency to respond to these solicitations in such a way as to 
bring the current situation closer to the agent’s sense of an optimal gestalt” (Drey-
fus, 2002, p. 1). Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor for understanding maximal grip is that 
it is akin to the optimal distance to stand from a painting, which varies by painting, 
for optimal visibility (Dreyfus, 2004). This metaphor highlights the varied nature of 
maximal grip. Both the optimal distance to stand from a painting and maximal grip in 
response to a situation are variable and unique. Such an approach heavily decentral-
izes rule-based approaches to how humans operate, which will be explored in greater 
depth later with regards to universal grammar. The learner is driven by the situation 
in which they find themselves to strive for a sort of homeostasis with that situation. In 
Dreyfus’ words, “finite, involved, embodied coping beings are constantly ‘motivated’ 
to move so as to achieve the best possible grip on the world…acting is experienced 
as a steady flow of skillful activity in response to one’s sense of the situation” (p. 234). 
While the traditional understanding of intelligence and skill-acquisition is based on a 
trial-and-error approach in which successful actions are repeated and unsuccessful 
actions are eliminated, the maximal grip understanding is dynamic. This approach 
gives us a view of human activity in which the learner is striving for an action which 
improves the situation towards the purpose at hand rather than fulfilling a certain 
static goal (p. 241). 
In many situations, and with respect to many skills, there is not one ‘right’ way to do 
the task, but perhaps a variety of better ways. This dynamic process towards maxi-
mal grip depends on exploration of alternative approaches in order to understand 
the continuum of these superior and inferior ways (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 243), and in 
moving towards an expertise, such exploration becomes gradually less necessary as 
the learner knows an optimal or superior approach to the situation. This does not im-
ply that the expert does not experiment, as many experts may still innovate through 
experimentation (Wrathall, 2014, p. 11), but rather that experimentation in order to 
achieve maximal grip is no longer strictly necessary. 
Intentional arc and maximal grip provide interesting, non-representationalist ac-
counts for certain features of second language acquisition. Intentional arc and maxi-
mal grip explain purposiveness in such a way that representation of the end goal is 
no longer necessary to explain a skill. When someone is learning to beat eggs, for in-
stance, he is not necessarily operating with a representation of what he is aiming for 
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and thus judging the difference between what he produces and what he wanted to 
produce. Likewise, a chess student is not comparing his chess game to a grandmaster 
chess match during play. Both learners are attempting to beat the eggs or play the 
game well enough based on their sense of the situation. Since initial stages in skill ac-
quisition for Dreyfus often include some amount of representation and abstract rules, 
the beginners may judge their grip on things based on such features, but this may not 
be a representation of the end goal. To return to the chess match, if the learner is as-
signing point values to pieces (abstract rules) rather than intuiting certain responses 
to the opponent (concrete response), he still may not be representing to himself a 
perfect chess match, not only because that is not an entirely feasible model for skill 
acquisition, but also because he probably wouldn’t know what one looked like. Even 
watching someone else beat an egg only tells us so much about what that process is. 
We may know what the physical end stage looks like and have an idea of the viscos-
ity, but angle and speed, among other factors, are achieved for the learner through 
repetition and experimentation, not through abstract ideas. Simply put, the learner 
experiments and in doing so engages with his world towards better but not necessar-
ily right ways of doing the task because he has no way of knowing what success as a 
static moment looks like. He has no idea (and no representation of) what he is doing. 
Just as a chess student is unlikely to have a mental representation of the best way to 
play the game, a language student is also unlikely to have a mental representation 
of the best way to say what he is trying to say. While the student may not have a con-
crete and static notion of how he should say what he is going to say, a sufficiently ad-
vanced student would be basing his decisions on prior encounters with the language 
to move towards maximal grip at that moment. The dynamic and process-based na-
ture of the intentional arc and movement towards maximal grip is particularly visible 
in dyadic instances wherein a direct response to one’s companion. Such instances 
include, among other practices, chess playing, tennis, sword-fighting, one-on-one 
formal debate and conversation. This last example is the most pertinent to second-
language acquisition discussion. 
The language student, without being able to represent and achieve a perfect utter-
ance, is instead in the situation of the chess student, wherein experimentation is nec-
essary. It is unlikely that she would have heard the original utterance that she wants 
to express before, barring some basic commonly used phrase. It is necessary for the 
student to pick the better of the available options and adjust according to the sub-
sequent situation. In this way the student must in the process of attempting to con-
verse, navigate concerns of grammar, word choice, tone, body language, gesture and 
content. Certain signs from her interlocutor, such as a change in facial expression 
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that indicate whether or not her utterance was understood, may alter her perception 
of the situation such that she finds she is moving towards maximal grip or away from 
it. Experimentation in these utterances pushes the learner to fine-tune what she is 
trying to convey to move towards maximal grip. 
While with chess we may see a linear decline in experimentation as certain responses 
become normal for the player, the rate of experimentation for a language learner 
may vary during the process. In the beginning stages when a learner has limited vo-
cabulary and grammar, there is little room for experimentation, as there is for a chess 
player who can only move certain pieces. Later on, when the student is exposed, 
through target language materials or formal instruction, to more grammatical struc-
tures and vocabulary, there will be more room to experiment. During the student’s 
progress through more advanced stages, there may be more experimentation with 
regards to word choice, and less with regards to grammar, as certain errors become 
more obvious to the student, or the implications of certain types of verb conjuga-
tions are more obvious. Eventually, apparently “automatic” production of language 
in response to the interlocutor, with approximately the same immediacy and gram-
matical perfection as one’s native language, happens with little to no experimenta-
tion. A sense of what feels right, or sounds right, may be the appropriate way for a 
language learner to approach the situation, and if the student has learned to self-
regulate their language productions sufficiently, he shows the internalization of the 
target language as described in sociocultural theories of second language acquisi-
tion. Such auto-regulation is often considered a measurement of a more adept lan-
guage speaker as well. Likewise, affective perceptions of the conversation incorrectly 
or correctly influence the learner’s perspective on the conversation, steering further 
language choices. 
One of the more interesting philosophical consequences of the intentional arc and 
maximal grip approach to skill acquisition and second language acquisition is that 
it fundamentally diminishes the significance of rules in expert behavior. This echoes 
the radical anti-intellectualist view indicated previously, but the consequences of 
this for the fields of philosophy of mind and second language acquisition are easily 
underestimated. If this is indeed a phenomenologically, philosophically and empiri-
cally tenable explanation for skill acquisition then, “[the learner] is doing just what 
Feigenbaum feared he might be doing—recognizing thousands of special cases” 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1985, p. 36). As previously noted, this possibility indicated our 
status as embodied and embedded creatures in a Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontian 
sense, and the primacy of knowledge-that in the form of conception and representa-
tion is dubitable. As far as its consequences for second language acquisition, such 
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a knowledge-how orientation would to a large extent undermine the poverty of the 
stimulus argument for universal grammar. 
Chomsky’s universal grammar (1977) refers to a number of structures that are com-
mon to every language, and therefore thought to be common to how humans think. 
Such structures include verbs being altered in some way to fit the subject and ne-
gation (VanPatten, 2017a). These grammar structures are not the surface grammar 
that is discussed when one learns how to write in a grammatically correct way but 
are thought to refer to more internalized structures that all or most languages have 
in common (VanPatten 2017b). Such a system of internalized, unconscious rules is 
commonly referred to as a response to the logical problem of language acquisition, 
wherein “learners eventually know more about the language than they could reason-
ably have learned if they had to depend entirely on the input they are exposed to” 
(Lightbrown & Spada, 2006, p. 35). Learners often produce certain statements that are 
not entirely traceable to the input they have received from the language. Whereas a 
knowledge-that centered view of the mind makes it impossible to show such spon-
taneity without some structure like universal grammar, if we can learn how to do 
something without a representation of what we are learning how to do, in a nearly 
perpetual state of adjustment and experimentation, we really do show a tremendous 
amount of special case knowledge, accrued through the intentional arc. After all, a 
tennis player needs to adapt to the particularities of her opponent and respond to his 
shots based on past experiences with other opponents. The impressiveness and diffi-
culty of responsiveness and generalization does not cause us to assume that we have 
innate pattern recognition abilities for tennis shots specifically. 
The remarkable abilities we show as regards language learning can reflect that lan-
guages are a feature of our shared world in a Wittgensteinian sense. As Coope writes, 
“It is a curious fact of life that human languages are translatable” (1974, p. 261). Hope-
fully it is obvious that stating that all human languages are translatable does not mean 
that such translation is always direct or easy. Despite overly dramatic statements 
about foreign terms that cannot be translated, there are precious few instances in 
which a term really cannot be translated and this compatibility between human lan-
guages should not be surprising at all. The central commonality of human languages 
is that they are spoken by humans, and so of course they are going to reflect similar 
common-sense aspects of reality. Subject-verb agreement, for instance, makes sense 
when we live in a world wherein actions originate from actors. When we consider the 
common-sense aspects of reality that are reflected in universal grammar, it is a possi-
bility that these features are not necessarily engrained in the human mind’s approach 
to language, but rather reflective of very basic commonalities in human experience.
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Knowledge-how does not exist in the form of accessed representation, but rather is 
perpetually in response to our situatedness. To return to Dreyfus’s example of the 
chess player, 
a careful description of the phenomenon suggests that, while beginners 
learn to distinguish specific patterns and follow rules for how to respond 
to them, the chess master, by playing thousands of games, has refined his 
dispositions to respond appropriately to each situation, and these changing 
dispositions to respond are correlated with changing lines of force on the 
board, which in turn solicit appropriate responses. So there is no need for 
the expert to remember or in any way store a repertoire of 50,000 typical 
positions (2004, p. 239). 
While it may be a stretch to say that language goes un-stored in exactly the same way, 
the role of immediacy and aptness of response is significant to second-language ac-
quisition, as it is in the playing of chess. Responsiveness and adaptability to one’s en-
vironment are significant to formulate consistent theories of knowledge and theories 
regarding the mind. If this responsiveness, or intentional arc, based in a fundamental 
unity with one’s surroundings, the problem of an end goal in conversation becomes, 
rather than the expression of a specific idea, a fluid process towards maximal grip. 
Affect and intention, then, become indispensable tools in this navigation.
Language, and the process of learning a language, are key to many aspects of the 
human experience and as such, questions in philosophy of language are irrevoca-
bly tied to questions in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Compatible with a 
non-representationalist view of the mind, Dreyfus’ presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
intentional arc and maximal grip in the form of skillful coping, demonstrates a view 
of human action in which we are in a constant and affective response to our environ-
ment. Such a take on language eschews the need for explanations regarding how 
much knowledge we seem to have regarding language, as this knowledge is prac-
ticed, dynamic and responsive, and does not exist as mere static mental representa-
tion. In this dynamic state, intuition and affect are factors with which the embodied 
and situated learner navigates the conversation and bends her expression towards 
maximal grip. 
Skillful coping remains a fruitful phenomenological explanation for many learning 
and skill acquisition experiences, including ones involving language. An intercultural 
and social take on language proposes many vibrant philosophical questions regard-
ing the philosophical implications of scaffolding, social cognition, and cultural iden-
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tity. Additionally, a non-representationalist take on the topic eschews dualisms and 
directs philosophical inquiry towards holistic investigation. The account of maximal 
grip for second language acquisition outlined in this paper is merely a first step. 
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